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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
1~11:X:'\ETrr :\IO'I'OR CO:\IPANY, 
Plaintiff-AppellantJ 
vs. 
:\li\.1-tl\: L. L \TON, THE 'l,RA 'TEL- Case No. 
EllS INSURANCE CO:\IJ->.l\NY, ) 9680 
a corporation, DefendantsJ 
lTXI'fED S T r\ T E S FIDELITY 
.~.\ND GUr\RANTY CO~IP r\.N\T, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff-appellant has asked this Court to set 
aside l~.,indings of Fact and Conclusions of La\v on 
notice of cancellation to the plaintiff because of failure 
of the eYidence of respondent LT.S.F.&G. Respondent 
does not argue that point and admits that the la"T is 
contained in appellant's cases; but subtnits the matter 
to the l_,ourt on t'vo issues of construction of documents 
and the consequent issues of la"· raised thereby. 
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The first of respondent's issues relates to liability, 
and the second to claim of release because of loss of 
subrogation rights. 
POINT I. THE INSURER ''r AS LIABLE 
TO 'l,HE PLAIN'l,I~,F LIENHOLDER. 
Respondent's argument emphasizes "direct and 
accidental loss" from the policy language, and appellant 
has argued that the langauge of the loss payable clause 
prevents escape from liability due to any act or neglect 
of the owner. 
The parties agree that this was a ''standard or 
union" loss payable clause \vhich created a new contract 
between the lienholder and the insurer, making inap-
plicable the cases under the usual "as its interest may 
appear'' or open clause under "Thich the lienholder's 
right is derivative from the insured owner's right. 
There are two fundamental differences in the posi-
tions of the parties here : 
Respondent contends that if a loss is not "direct 
and accidental" as to the o'Yner, it cannot be "direct 
and accidental" as to the lienholder. (Resp. Brief, page 
12-14). 
Rsepondent also argues that the only occasion for 
exclusion of en1bezzle1nent and conYersion in the loss 
payable clause is in the eyent CoYerage G of the policy 
has been taken (Resp. Brief page 1.t) ; appellant con-
tends that the exclusion is put in the loss payable clause 
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to tnakc plain that if Co,·erage D is taken in the policy 
there is no liabilitr to the mortgagee or lienholder for 
ctnbezzletnent, eon,·ersion and secretion unless Coverage 
(; is also taken. 
l{espotHlent attempts to give a special meaning to 
·~direct and aecidental/' which cannot be supported from 
the policy or frotn its cases. 
Respondent's cases at page 9 of its brief are not 
in point. Only t"ro of them, I...~ewis and Wong, discuss 
the Ineaning of "direct and accidental loss." And in 
both of those cases, the action was brought by the person 
eonunitting the destruction. '"fhe cases hold pritnarily 
that one \vho intentionally destroys insured property 
cannot recover for the loss from the insurer. Lewis is an 
action by tnortgagee under an ordinary clause; Fedele, 
Il ary rove, 0 ri e nt I nsu ran cc, and Chaachou are actions 
by O\\·ners \vhose O\\'n \vrongs defeated recovery; and 
in TJTong. Bellman, Jones and l(lemens partners or 
other joint O\vners' clairns were held defeated by the 
intentional destruction by the co-insured. Appellant 
has no quarrel with these cases; they simply do not help 
in deciding ,,·hether appellant can recover for a loss 
,,·here adtnittedly the o\vner could not. Tamiami holds 
that mere negligence does not defeat the insured and 
the An1erican Juris prudence citation concludes that 
intentional burning by others does not ordinarily defeat 
the action of the insured, \vhich is of course the position 
plaintiff urges upon the Court. 
R,espoialent cites three cases \vhich requtre 1nore 
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careful analysis. U.S. 'Trust vs. ''rest Texas State Bank 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) 272 S.,,r. 2d 627; and South-
western Funding Corp. v. Motors Ins. Corp. (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1962) 22 Cal. Reporter 781, both involve 
construction of a clause in auton1obile policies restricting 
coverage to accidents 'vhich occur "while the automobile 
is in the United States." Both accidents occurred in 
Mexico, and the place of destruction was held to place 
the loss outside the coverage. There were standard loss 
payable clauses in both cases and protection against 
act or neglect of the owner was held not to give coverage 
to the lienholder. 
'rhis is treated like cyclone or windstorm, which has 
to be covered by specific coverage. Theft by the owner 
may also be guarded against. Arson is covered by the 
fire coverage, and there is no other '"'ay provided by 
the policy for the lienholder to have that coverage. 
Travelers Insurance C.o. v. Springfield Fire & 
Marine Insurance Co., 8 Cir., 89 Fed. 2d 757, is cited 
by Respondent at page 10. At page 761, of the report, 
the Court held as to the standard loss payable clause 
on the question of whether a requirement of payment 
of premium \\"as binding on the mortgagee: 
"Provisions of the policy '"hich are in conflict 
'"ith provisions of the Inortgage clause or which 
that clause indicates '"ere not intended to apply 
to the Inortgaga!,Yould, of course, form no part 
of the contract bet,Yeen the mortgagee and the 
insurer. Prot·isions of the jJolicy rchich are clearly 
intended to condition the insurance granted by 
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/he i1untrer to both 1nortyagor and mortgagee 
7oould forn~ a part of the contract of insurance 
h'ilh the ntortyaycc as rcell as 1.cith the mortgagor. 
It scen1s clear to us that the suspension clause 
of the poliey in suit was such a provision. 'l.,he 
poliey pr<n·ides that, if an installment of pre-
Iniunl is not paid "·hen due, the insurance shall 
lapse until pay1nent is rnade, when it shall re-
YiYe." ( En1phasis supplied). 
1\nd because the mortgagee also had it within his power 
to extend the insurance, and failed to do so, he could 
not coin plain at the result reached. 
The loss payable clause here provides specifically 
that no aet or neglect of the owner shall invalidate the 
insurance or defeat recovery by the lienholder. Nothing 
\vas expected of the mortgagee which was not done 
and 'vhich related to the loss suffered. A plain reading 
of the loss payable clause compels the conclusion that 
the n1ortgagee 'viii not lose his claim by reason of any 
act or neglect of the owner except as stated. Should 
the loss result from conversion, embezzlement or secre-
tion, a question 'vould be raised as to whether the 
required coverage had been taken. As to loss by inten-
tional fire, no doubt is suggested on the face of the 
clause. Reference to the policy would be needed only 
to determine the vehicle covered, the time of insurance, 
and the types of coverage . 
... t\ ppellant argues in its brief (page 32) that the 
exclusion of certain conduct of the insured fron1 cover-
age itnplies that other conduct of the insured is not 
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excluded from coverage. Respondent takes issue with 
this argument in its brief (pages 14 and 15). 
The clause (Ex. 3) provides that this insurance 
as to lienholder " ... shall not be invalidated by any act 
of the . . . owner" nor by a change in ownership and 
then excludes from this broad saving clause conversion, 
embezzlement and secretion by the owner unless speci-
fically insured against. That specific insurance is cover-
age G, the broad theft coverage. 
If specifically insured against (under Coverage G) 
there is no question of the lienholder's right to recover, 
so that language about "act or neglect of the owner" 
implies coverage as to conversion and embezzlement 
without the specific coverage, requiring that the other 
coverage be negatived. That other coverage, which must 
be negatived, is Coverage D-comprehensive coverage 
- direct and accidental loss which includes "theft." 
Therefore, direct and accidental loss from theft by act 
of the owner would be covered were it not for the exclu-
sion. Respondent's argument ignores the fact that 
Coverage D also covers theft and considers it a "direct 
and accidental loss." 
The analysis is as f ollo,vs: There are t'vo coverages 
for "theft": Coverage D which is the comprehensive 
and general, and Coverage G, "·hich is the specific broad 
theft coverage. Theft coverage under D is implicit fron1 
the need to exclude it by the "rords: "provided, however, 
that the conversion, embezzlement or secretion by the 
Lessee, mortgagor or Purchaser in possession of the 
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property insured under a bailn1ent lease, conditional 
sale. tnortgage or other encumbrance is not covered 
under sueh poliey" and then the clause contemplates 
('overage (; in Exhibit ~ by adding: "unless specifically 
insured against and preinium paid therefor ... " 
There is no "broad fire" clause comparable to the 
''broad theff' clause. If the premium is paid under 
l.~oYerage 11\ there can be no recovery by the owner 
for arson because the insured can't profit from his own 
'\vrong, "·hich is all that respondent's cases on page 9 
of its brief hold. But there is no special premium pro-
Yision to protect lienholder against owner's act of inten-
tional burning~ and, therefore, the language of the loss 
payable elause provides protection as it would for theft 
if not specifically excluded. Arson is not excluded and 
is, therefore, covered. 
Respondent ignores other policy provisions in ar-
guing that "direct and accidental'' has no application 
to theft. Exclusion paragraph ( o) lumps together 
('overages D and G as to theft or conversion by a 
person in possession, although Coverage D calls it 
direct and accidental loss and Coverage D doesn't say, 
but both deal with theft. 
And insuring Agreement l'"III povides broadly 
that "'rhis policy applies only to accidents 'vhich occur 
and to direct and accidental losses to the automobile." 
"':-\.nd yet theft is covered t'vice and obviously involves an 
intentional act. 
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It thus appears plain from the policy itself that 
theft loss is covered as to the owner when it is com-
mitted by a third person and is, therefore, direct and 
accidental; but as to the lienholder there is protection 
against intentional conversion or theft by the owner 
only if the applicable premium under Coverage G has 
been paid. We, therefore, reiterate our argument that 
since the only exclusion from protection to the lienholder 
under the loss payable clause against "act or neglect of 
the owner" is from conversion and embezzlement (un· 
less Coverage G is taken) by rule of interpretation 
other intentional acts of the owner are insured against, 
but recovery would be defeated if the lienholder were 
implicated in the wrong. 
Respondent's brief overlooks the further fact that 
the phrase "direct and accidental" is a condition of the 
policy between the owner and the insurer and is speak-
ing from the point of view of those parties. If a stranger 
to the policy and the automobile intentionally burned 
the truck, recovery could be had by the owner under 
the policy unless the owner was charged with complicity, 
because as to the owner that would be accidental. Couch 
on Insurance, Section 1157 says that the felonious act 
of a third person is direct and accidental under the 
standard loss payable clause. Warner vs. U.S. Mutual 
Accident Association, 8 U. 431, 32 P. 696, states that 
death by an assassin or burglar is "accidental" as to 
deceased. Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 7 53, Insurance, 
p. 777, says "accidental" is not a word "Tith technical 
meaning· in the la,v, and is "an event which takes place 
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\\'ithout the foresight or expectation of the person acted 
011 or a fl'ected hy the event . . . ; unusual and not ex-
peeted hy the person to \\·hom it happens." And 29A 
~ \.tnerieall Juris prudence, p. 427, states that intentional 
burning by others does not defeat the insured. Other 
authorities are cited at page 28 of Appellant's brief. 
See als<) Durbach v. ~.,idelity and Guaranty Co. (N.J. 
Super. 85 1\. 2d 315, 316. 
"fhe poliey itself indicates that intentional miscon .. 
duet by an independent third party is direct and acci-
dental so far as the insured is concerned. Coverage D 
is for '"direct and accidental loss of or damage to the 
auton1obile . . . except loss caused by collision . . . or 
by upset ... lJreakage of glass and loss caused by ... 
theft . . . shall not be deemed loss caused by collision 
or upset.'' Theft implies the independent act of a third 
party but is "direct and accidental" under this clause. 
1:\nd like,vise, insofar as the lienholder is concerned, 
the intentional destruction by fire without complicity of 
the lienholder is a direct and accidental loss. Respondent 
does not cite a single case or authority \vhich suggests 
any different result. 
POIXT II. I)IP AIR~IEN'l, OF SUBROGA-
TIOX RIGHTS. 
Respondent's argu1nent and authorities completley 
ignore the facts that both the respondent and the Travel-
ers Insurance (\). \vere in the same position of having 
Ic,sses upon \\·hich the O\vner could make no recovery but 
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the lienholder could and had equal rights against both 
the insurance companies. 
As one of the respondent's authorities, Zeiger vs. 
Farmers and Laborers Co-op, 217 S.W. 2d, 426, says, 
the rights of the parties in a situation like this are not 
based upon the insurance policy, but upon the loss pay-
able clause. That clause suggests no theory or basis 
upon which U.S.F.&G. would have a right to go against 
Travelers and be made whole, and no theory of sub-
rogation to that end. 'fhe two insurance companies 
stand as several obligors being bound equally to the 
lienholder and having a complete defense against the 
owner. 
The conditions of the policy are not controlling, 
but condition No. 20 plainly provides that where there 
are two insurance policies, each will be bound for that 
proportion of the loss which its coverage represents. 
Both policies in this case covered the actual value of the 
automobile; and, therefore, the risk of loss was equal 
between them. Respondent has no basis for claim of 
damage arising from the settlement with TraYelers. 
That settlement eliminated one-half of any recovery 
that might be made and permitted respondent to go 
against the owner for any amount it paid the lienholder. 
The fallacy of respondent's argument is indicated 
by the quotation from 6 Apple1nan on Insurance, page 
565, at pages 17 and 18 of its brief. That quotation 
involves a situation "There a Inortgagor had taken out 
two policies of fire coyerage one of 'vhich had been can-
celled "Tithout the consent of the mortgagee, and had 
10 
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hrought an aetion to detertnine '"hich company should 
pay the n1ortgagor. It contemplates also that one of 
the insurers "·as liable to the mortgagor for the full 
atnount of the loss and should, therefore, be required 
to pay the tnortgagee to avoid circuity of action. In the 
case before the court there is no company which has an 
ohligation to the n1ortgagor, with clear liability as to 
all or a part of the loss. 
It is true that the clause provides that when the 
company pays the lienholder and claims no liability to 
the o"·ner, the company shall be subrogated to the 
rights of the parties to 'vhom the payment is made, 
\vhieh in this case 'vould be the lienholder plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's right is to go equally against the two insurers 
and to recover against either. A reasonable allocation 
of that right is one-half to each, which is the theory of 
the settlement made vlith Travelers. Both companies 
had the same clause and the same right; and if each 
company paid one-half of the loss, each would be sub-
rogated to the right of the mortgagee, which "\Vas to 
sue both companies. It is obvious that there was no 
effective subrogation right in this case unless one of the 
insurers paid the entire loss and then went against the 
other insurer to require a sharing of the loss. 
The cases cited at page 16 of respondent's brief 
all involve situations 'vhere there were at least two 
insurers, at least one of 'vhich 'vas bound to the owner 
for the full an1ount of its policy, and each case also 
involved one or 1nore con1panies bound to the lienholder 
and not to the o'vner by reason of lapse, cancellation, 
11 
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or exclusion of the owner. The insurers were in different 
positions of liability and the rights of subrogation, 
therefore, became important since one company was 
bound to the owner and the other \Vas not. 
Respondent's brief is based on the assumption that 
it had a right to come out of the case whole even if the 
plaintiff had won as against both insurers. Such a claim 
cannot be substantiated either from the loss payable 
clauses or the authorities. The stipulation dismissing as 
to Travelers was fair to the respondent, and the respond-
ent had the same opportunity to get out of the case that 
Travelers had, but chose instead to try to defeat the 
claim of plaintiff on the issue of liability. 
Respondent at page 17 quotes from 6 Appleman, 
Insurance, Section 407 4, page 565 n. 64, a passage relat-
ing to an action by a mortgagor against two insurance 
companies where the mortgagor had cancelled one policy 
without consent of mortgagee and taken another policy. 
The next page, 566, covers our situation where the 
treatise states: 
"Where a mortgagor took out a second policy 
without the mortgagee's knowledge or consent, 
the first insurer could not be subrogated against 
the second co1npany, the judgment against both 
insurers haYing apportioned the loss." Citing a 
Texas case, Union Assur. Soc. v. Equitable 
'Trust Co., CiY. App., 63 S.,V. 2d 869, aff'd 94 
S.W. 2d 1151, 127 Tex. 618. 
And the same treatise states that where there are 
two insurers the liability is several, and if one pays the 
entire loss it is entitled only to proportionate contribu-
12 
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tiotl. J. \ pplernan, See. 4Bl3, pp. :~87, 388, with 1nany 
cases eited in n. iO. 
Itespondent has the benefit of proportionate con-
tribution "·ithout paying. 
CONCLl~SION 
Liability of respondent under the loss payable clause 
is supported by: 
lllain language of the clause protecting the lien-
holder against any act or neglect of the owner; 
Construction of the clause which excludes conver-
sion and embezzletnent unless specifically insured against 
and prerniun1 paid, thus leaving intentional fire as a 
covered risk; 
~leaning of direct and accidental which, as to lien-
holder, includes conduct of the owner not foreseen by 
or chargeable to the lienholder. 
'fhere 'vas no release of respondent by the settle-
nlent "·ith TraYelers "·hich accorded to U.S.F.&G. the 
proportionate liability to "·hich it was entitled. 
'fhe judgment should be reversed and the District 
Court directed to enter judgment for the plaintiff for 
~·) •) .. 0 00 
'.-u, .. .:J • • 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH.1-\.RDS ,BIRD AND HART 
716 X e'vhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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